This paper shows that bargainers may reach delayed agreements even in environments where there is no uncertainty about payo↵s or feasible actions. Under such conditions, delay may arise when bargainers face direct forms of strategic uncertainty-i.e., uncertainty about the opponent's play. The paper restricts the nature of this uncertainty in two important ways. First, it assumes on-path strategic certainty: bargainers face uncertainty only after surprise moves. Second, it assumes Battigalli and Siniscalchi's (2002) rationality and common strong belief of rationality (RCSBR)-a requirement that bargainers are "strategically sophisticated." The main result characterizes the set of outcomes consistent with on-path strategic certainty and RCSBR. It shows that these assumptions allow for delayed agreement, despite the fact that the bargaining environment is one of complete information. The source of delay is second-order optimism: Bargainers do not put forward "good" o↵ers early in the negotiation process because they fear that doing so will cause the other party to become more optimistic about her future prospects.
delays in reaching agreements are typically costly for both parties. That is, there are often ine cient delays in reaching agreements. Examples include strikes, holdouts, legislative stalemates, renegotiations of debt contracts, wars, etc.
What is the source of such ine cient delays? The negotiations literature has long argued that they are a consequence of strategic uncertainty-i.e., uncertainty about how the others negotiate. (See, e.g., Walton and McKersie, 1965, pp. 37 .) It is immediate that such uncertainty can lead to ine cient delays in reaching agreement: A bargainer may o↵er a split of the pie with the expectation that the o↵er will be accepted; this expectation may be incorrect and the o↵er may, in fact, be rejected. This paper uses the tools of epistemic game theory to model strategic uncertainty. However, it restricts the nature of the uncertainty. Specifically, it studies strategic uncertainty that arises only after surprise moves in the negotiation process: At the start of the game, the bargainers have correct beliefs about how negotiations will unfold. They continue to hold those beliefs as long as there are no surprise moves. They face uncertainty only after surprise proposals or surprise rejections. This form of strategic uncertainty will be called on-path strategic certainty. Arguably, such strategic uncertainty is natural. In fact, the negotiations literature has recognized that it may arise (Stuart, 2004) .
One might conjecture that this form of strategic uncertainty is inconsistent with inefficient delays in reaching agreement-at least if the bargainers are "strategically sophisticated" and there are no informational asymmetries: If the bargainers have correct ex ante beliefs about the outcome that will obtain, then they have the same expectation about the utility profile that will obtain. So, if delay were ex ante ine cient, strategically sophisticated bargainers would make mutually beneficial o↵ers and avoid delay. However, this conjecture is incorrect. The goal of this paper shows that there may be ine cient delays in reaching agreement, even if the bargainers satisfy on-path strategic certainty, are strategically sophisticated, and face no uncertainty about the bargaining game.
To show this, we study the canonical alternating o↵ers bargaining game (Ståhl, 1977; Rubinstein, 1982 ) and provide a model in which "strategically sophisticated" bargainers reason under strategic uncertainty. The bargainers are strategically sophisticated in the sense of satisfying Battigalli and Siniscalchi's (2002) rationality and common strong belief of rationality (RCSBR). Theorems 6.1-6.2 characterize the set of outcomes consistent with on-path strategic certainty and RCSBR. The characterization shows the possibility of delay;
if the discount factor is su ciently high, there may be delays in reaching agreement.
The source of delay is second-order optimism: Bargainers do not put forward "good" o↵ers early in the negotiation process because they fear that doing so will cause the other party to become more optimistic about her future prospects. To better understand the idea, suppose it is commonly understood that bargainers B1 and B2 will agree on an x : 1 x split of the pie in period n 2. As delay is ine cient, they would prefer an x : 1 x split earlier. But, bargainer B1 refrains from proposing x : 1 x upfront-despite the fact that she (correctly) expects that B2 will also view the o↵er as beneficial. The key is that such a proposal (necessarily) causes B2 to become more optimistic relative to his initial expectations. The fact that there is delay in reaching agreement indicates that B1 fears B2's optimistic-update will trigger further optimism on B2's part-causing B2 to believe that he can do even better by rejecting the mutually beneficial o↵er. Proposition 7.1 establishes this fact. It shows that on-path strategic certainty, initial belief of on-path strategic certainty, and RCSBR, imply that delay must be an artifact of second-order optimism.
While Theorems 6.1-6.2 allow for delay, they also restrict the set of predicted outcomes.
The restriction can be large when there is a significant gap between o↵ers (i.e., a low discount factor) or when there is a tight deadline. For instance, with a deadline of three or four bargaining periods, there is no delay past period two. On the other hand, in an important limiting case, there is an 'anything goes' result. Specifically, when the time between o↵ers is short and there is no deadline, essentially any outcome is consistent with RCSBR and on-path strategic certainty. 1 Literature The standard game-theoretic approach focuses on Nash equilibrium. In so doing, it implicitly assumes that bargainers have correct beliefs about future behaviorboth on and o↵ the path of play. Much like Nash equilibrium, the approach here assumes that there are correct beliefs along the path of play. However, unlike Nash equilibrium, it allows bargainers to have incorrect beliefs o↵ the path of play. In this sense, it is closer in spirit to self-confirming equilibrium (Fudenberg and Levine, 1993) .
Typically, the literature models strategic uncertainty implicitly: It assumes that strategic uncertainty is an artifact of incomplete information. Prominent examples are uncertainty about valuations (e.g., Admati and Perry, 1987; Sobel and Takahashi, 1983; Cramton, 1984; Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole, 1985) or the cost of waiting (e.g., Rubinstein, 1985; Watson, 1998) . We provide a rationale for ine cient agreements in a complete information environment. 2 This is important, since certain negotiation failures are not well-explained by incomplete information-specifically, certain negotiations that take place in the context of long-run relationships. Fearon (2004, page 290) and Powell (2006, page 172) put forward this argument in the context of wars; Online Appendix D argues that their point applies to other long-term relationships.
At the surface, strategic uncertainty sounds similar to uncertainty about strategic pos-ture, where there is uncertainty about whether a player is committed to implementing a particular strategy. (See, e.g., Chatterjee and Samuelson, 1987; Myerson, 1997; Abreu and Gul, 2000; Compte and Jehiel, 2002; Abreu and Pearce, 2007; Wolitzky, 2012; Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti, 2015a,b.) One might conjecture that modeling uncertainty about strategic posture (and focusing on the sequential equilibrium thereof) is su cient to model any form of strategic uncertainty. However, the strategic incentives are quite di↵erent. When there is uncertainty about strategic posture, non-obstinate behavior reveals that a bargainer is strategic; in turn, this gives bargainers an incentive to signal that they they are obstinate or "irrational." In contrast, here, bargainers fear that a "better-than-expected proposal" will signal irrationality and future conciliatory behavior; put di↵erently, here, delay is an artifact of a bargainer's attempt to not signal irrationality. Section 10.D shows that, in the presence of outside options, the two theories generate di↵erent predictions for delay.
Heuristic Exposition: Three-Period Deadline
This section provides a heuristic treatment for the case of a three-period deadline. It illustrates the model and provides intuition for the two main results.
Two bargainers negotiate on how to split a pie of size 1. Refer to Bargainer 1 (B1) as 'she' and Bargainer 2 (B2) as 'he.' The game is a three-period alternating o↵ers bargaining problem: B1 begins the game by o↵ering an allocation-i.e., a split of the pie (x 1 , x 2 ). If the o↵er is accepted, the game is over. If it is rejected, B2 o↵ers an allocation (y 1 , y 2 ). And so on. If, in period n 2 {1, 2, 3}, the bargainers agree to an allocation (x 1 , x 2 ), then their payo↵s are given by ( n 1
x 1 , n 1 x 2 ), where 2 (0, 1) is a common discount factor. If there is perpetual disagreement, then their payo↵s are (0, 0).
Strategic Uncertainty
The premise is that each bargainer faces strategic uncertaintyi.e., uncertainty about how the other plays the game. With this in mind, we will enrich the definition of the game to include the bargainers' hierarchies of beliefs about the play of the game. 3 In this expanded definition of a game, the bargainers are described by a state-i.e., a strategy-type pair (s 1 , t 1 , s 2 , t 2 ). The strategy s i describes Bi's play and the type t i describes her hierarchies of conditional beliefs. Section 4 expands on this model. We focus on the case in which strategic uncertainty arises only after surprise moves in the negotiation process. The idea is captured by a criterion that we call on-path strategic certainty: along the path of play, the bargainers have correct beliefs about the play of the game. This condition restricts the set of states that we focus on. To understand how, consider two strategy profiles (s 1 , s 2 ) and (s 1 , r 2 ) that induce di↵erent paths of play.
Suppose, at the start of the game, type t 1 assigns probability 1 to the event that "B2 plays the strategy s 2 ." Then, at a state (s 1 , t 1 , s 2 , ·), type t 1 has correct beliefs about the path of play; but, at a state (s 1 , t 1 , r 2 , ·), she has incorrect beliefs about the path of play. On-path strategic certainty rules out states of the latter form.
Note, if a state (s 1 , t 1 , s 2 , t 2 ) satisfies on-path strategic certainty, then the bargainers can have incorrect beliefs after a surprise move in the negotiation process. This is the particular form of strategic uncertainty that bargainers face.
Strategically Sophisticated Bargainers Strategic sophistication is captured by two criteria: rationality and forward-induction reasoning. Bi is rational if she chooses a strategy s i that maximizes her subjective conditional expected utility; that is, s i maximizes her expected utility at each information set, given her belief about how the other bargainer plays the game. Note, Bi's conditional beliefs are specified by her type. Thus, the event that Bi is rational is a subset of the strategy-type pairs for Bi.
Rationality requires that a bargainer maximizes given her beliefs. It does not restrict the beliefs themselves to be "strategically sophisticated." Forward-induction reasoning asks that beliefs be "strategic sophisticated," in the sense that they rationalize past behavior when possible. We follow Battigalli and Siniscalchi's (2002) formalization: Type t i rationalizes B( i)'s behavior when possible, if t i assigns probability 1 to the event "B( i) is rational," whenever she reaches a history consistent with that event. In that case, say that t i strongly believes that "B( i) is rational." (See Definition 4.3.) Moreover, we require that t i strongly believes that "B( i) is rational and strongly believes that 'Bi is rational.' " And so on. The full force of forward-induction reasoning is captured by rationality and common strong belief of rationality (RCSBR). Remark 5.1 further discusses the idea.
Big Picture Before turning to the details, we provide an overarching view of the results.
We first characterize the outcomes consistent with RCSBR and on-path strategic certainty.
The characterization will be captured by three constraints expressed entirely in terms of outcomes. Put di↵erently, the constraints themselves will not make reference to strategies and types-the bread and butter of the epistemic analysis. Nonetheless, the constraints capture all the implications of RCSBR and on-path strategic certainty.
We use the constraints to analyze the implications for delayed agreement. They rule out delay until the final period, but allow for delay until the penultimate period. This raises the question: What is the source of delay? We show that, under an additional mild requirement, the mechanism for delay must be second-order optimism.
The Upfront and Deadline Constraints Fix a state (s ⇤ 1 , t ⇤ 1 , s ⇤ 2 , t ⇤ 2 ) that results in delay-i.e., in an outcome (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 , n) with n 2. Suppose, at this state, there is rationality, strong belief of rationality, and on-path strategic certainty. We argue that these conditions alone imply that the outcome (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 , n) must satisfy three constraints: the Deadline Constraint and the B1-B2 Upfront Constraints.
We begin with the Deadline Constraint (DC). Consider the path of play induced
. Along that path, there is an n-period history at which B1 moves. (If n = 2, this is a history at which B1 accepts the proposal of (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 ); if n = 3, this is a history at which she proposes (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 ).) At that history, t ⇤ 1 correctly expects the outcome to be (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 , n). (This follows from on-path strategic certainty.) Note, at that point, she continues to maintain the hypothesis that B2 is rational. Thus, she maintains a hypothesis that, if the final bargaining phase is reached, B( i) will accept any strictly positive share of the pie. The fact that she does not wait implies that she prefers the allocation of (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 ) in period n versus waiting for essentially the full pie in the third period. 4 Since the value of the former is n 1
x ⇤ 1 and the value of the latter is 2 , the DC requires:
DC. B1 does not have an incentive to wait for the deadline: n 1 x ⇤ 1 2 .
Next, we turn to the B1-B2 Upfront Constraints (UCs). Consider the path of play induced by (s ⇤ 1 , t ⇤ 1 , s ⇤ 2 , t ⇤ 2 ). Since n 2, along that path, there is some history at which Bi makes a proposal. Consider the first such history-i.e., Bi's upfront history. At that upfront history, t ⇤ i correctly anticipates that the outcome will be (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 , n). (This follows from onpath strategic certainty.) Upfront, t ⇤ i also believes that B( i) is rational. So, upfront, each t ⇤ i anticipates that B( i) would accept an o↵er that gives B( i) more than the discounted total pie-i.e., more than . Thus, each Bi must prefer getting the allocation of (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 ) in period n to making an o↵er that, upfront, would give B( i) a share of the pie.
Note, the idea of an "upfront o↵er" is implemented di↵erently for the two bargainers.
An upfront o↵er occurs in period 1 for B1 and in period 2 for B2. As such, B1's constraint requires that receiving x ⇤ 1 in period n is preferred to (1 ) in period 1, while B2's constraint requires that receiving x ⇤ 2 in period n is preferred to (1 ) in period 2. As such, the UCs require:
B1's UC. B1 has no incentive to secure an acceptance upfront: n 1 x ⇤ 1 (1 ).
B2's UC. B2 has no incentive to secure an acceptance upfront: n 1 x ⇤
2
(1 ).
Taken together, the constraints imply that there can be no delay until the final period.
(When n = 3, the DC conflicts with B2's UC.) However, they allow for delay until period n = 2. In that case, the DC and B2's UC imply that (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 , n) = ( , 1 , 2). Adding B1's UC, we must additionally have 2 + 1. This is a requirement that the discount factor must be su ciently large so that waiting is profitable.
Characterization We argued that if an outcome is consistent with rationality, strong belief of rationality, and on-path strategic certainty, then it satisfies the DC and the B1-B2 UCs. So "minimal conditions" on strategic reasoning su ce to deliver these three constraints on outcomes. In turn, the constraints allow for delayed agreement.
One might conjecture that the delayed agreement is an artifact of limited strategic reasoning-i.e., we have only required that Bi strongly believes B( i) is rational. A main result of the paper shows that a stronger assumption on strategic sophistication-specifically, RCSBR-does not refine the restrictions imposed by the DC and the B1-B2 UCs. That is, if an outcome satisfies the both the DC and the B1-B2 UCs, then it is consistent with RCSBR and on-path strategic certainty. In the context of the three-period deadline, this is shown as Example 6.1. However, the conclusion holds beyond the three-period deadline.
Main Characterization (Theorems 6.1-6.2) (i) If an outcome is consistent with rationality, strong belief of rationality and onpath strategic certainty, then it satisfies the DC and the B1-B2 UCs.
(ii) If an outcome satisfies the DC and the B1-B2 UCs, then it is consistent with rationality, common strong belief of rationality, and common strong belief of onpath strategic certainty.
Taken together, the DC and the B1-B2 UCs characterize the outcomes consistent with RCSBR and on-path strategic certainty across all type structures. Thus, the analyst can use these constraints-expressed on outcomes alone-to study the predictions of RCSBR and on-path strategic certainty.
Second-Order Optimism The mechanism for delay is second-order optimism. To see this, return to the example of a three-period deadline. Fix a state (s ⇤ 1 , t ⇤ 1 , s ⇤ 2 , t ⇤ 2 ) at which there is rationality, strong belief of rationality, on-path strategic certainty, and delay in reaching agreement. We have seen that the state induces the outcome (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 , n) = ( , 1 , 2). We now argue that-under an additional mild requirement-type t ⇤ 1 must exhibit second-order optimism. This requirement is that type t ⇤ 1 also initially believes that there is on-path strategic certainty. We now explain.
At the start of the game, B1's expected payo↵s are 2 , and B2's are (1 ). With the additional requirement on B1's beliefs, t ⇤ 1 initially correctly anticipates both her and B2's expected payo↵s. Thus, in the first period, she anticipates that there is a mutually beneficial o↵er to be made-i.e., some (x 1 , x 2 ) ( 2 , (1 )). Why is such an o↵er not made? We will argue that B1 anticipates that the very act of making a mutually beneficial o↵er makes B2 more optimistic about her future prospects.
Suppose B1 initially proposes an o↵er (x 1 , x 2 ). Recall, type t ⇤ 1 strongly believes that B2 is rational. As such, she must anticipate that, conditional upon receiving the o↵er, B2's expected payo↵s must be least x 2 : If t ⇤ 1 expects B2 to accept the o↵er, she anticipates that B2's expected payo↵s are exactly x 2 ; if t ⇤ 1 expects B2 to reject the o↵er, she anticipates that B2 does so because B2's expected payo↵s, after receiving the o↵er, are greater than x 2 . When the o↵er is a mutually beneficial o↵er, x 2 > (1 ). Thus, t ⇤ 1 anticipates that, conditional upon receiving a mutually beneficial o↵er, B2's expected payo↵s are greater than (1 ). Put di↵erently, she reasons that the very act of making the mutually beneficial o↵er makes B2 more optimistic about his future prospects relative to B2's initial expectation of (1 ). We call this second-order optimism.
A subtle definitional point: If B1 were to make an alternate o↵er, then type t ⇤ 2 would actually be more optimistic about his future prospects, relative to his expectations at the start of the negotiation. However, at the state (s ⇤ 1 , t ⇤ 1 , s ⇤ 2 , t ⇤ 2 ), such an o↵er is not made, and so this form of optimism-a form of first-order optimism-never occurs.
Overview The paper proceeds as follows. Sections 3-4 introduce the bargaining game and the epistemic model of strategic uncertainty. Section 5 defines the key condition of strategic sophistication-namely, RCSBR. Section 6 characterizes the outcomes consistent with RCSBR and on-path strategic certainty. In so doing, it points to the possibility for delayed agreement. Section 7 shows that such delay must be an artifact of second-order optimism. Sections 8-9 revisit key ingredients of the analysis: Section 8 revisits the nature of the characterization result, highlighting that the result assumes that the analyst has no information about the bargainers' type structure. Section 9 revisits the extent to which on-path strategic certainty is required for the analysis. Finally, Section 10 concludes by drawing (behavioral) comparisons to the literature. 5
The Bargaining Game
We study the canonical alternating o↵ers bargaining model. Two bargainers, viz. B1 ('she') and B2 ('he'), negotiate on how to split a pie of size 1. Write i for a particular bargainer and i for the other bargainer. An allocation is a division of the pie-i.e., some
In each bargaining phase, some Bi assumes the role of the proposer, and the other B( i) assumes the role of the responder. Bi proposes an allocation (x 1 , x 2 ). B( i) chooses to accept (a) or reject (r) the proposal. If B( i) accepts, the game is over and the resulting allocation is (x 1 , x 2 ). If B( i) rejects, then a new bargaining phase begins. In the new bargaining phase, B( i) is in the proposer's role.
Period 1 begins with B1 in the proposer role; if the game does not conclude, Period 2 continues with B2 in the proposer role, etc. There are (at most) 
If the bargainers agree to the allocation (x 1 , x 2 ) in period n, we say that (x 1 , x 2 , n) is an n-period outcome. If there is perpetual disagreement, the disagreement outcome results; this is written as (x 1 , x 2 , N) = (0, 0, N).
There is a common discount factor of 2 (0, 1). Each Bi's utility function is
We can identify information sets with histories (i.e., sequences of moves). Say that h is an n-period history if it occurs in an n th -bargaining phase. The bargainer who moves at h takes on either the proposer role (and chooses an allocation) or the responder role (and accepts or rejects an o↵er). Write H P i for the set of histories at which Bi takes on the proposer role and H R i for the set of histories at which Bi takes the responder role. Then,
Note, carefully, we take the following convention: If Bi takes on the role of the proposer at h, then s i (h) specifies Bi's share of the allocation x i . Write S i for the set of strategies of Bi and endow S i with the product topology (Appendix A).
Each strategy profile induces a terminal history. Write Z for the set of terminal histories, and write ⇣ : S 1 ⇥ S 2 ! Z for the mapping from strategy profiles to terminal histories. In turn, each terminal history z 2 Z induces an outcome. Write ⇠ for the mapping from terminal histories to outcomes. So, (s 1 , s 2 ) induces the outcome (
Modeling Strategic Uncertainty
We use the language of conditional probability systems to model strategic uncertainty. Let us preview why this is the appropriate language: Because Bi faces uncertainty about the strategy B( i) plays, she begins the game with a belief about S i . However, over the course of playing the game, Bi may be forced to revise her beliefs. For instance, B2 may begin the game assigning probability 1 to B1 o↵ering (x 1 , x 2 ) = ( 1 4 , 3 4 ) upfront, only to instead receive (x 1 , x 2 ) = ( 1 2 , 1 2 ). At that point, B2 will need to form a new assessment about B1's future play. With this in mind, we view bargainers as having beliefs at each information set; the system of beliefs satisfies the rules of conditional probability, when possible.
Conditional Probability Systems
We begin with abstract definitions and later apply the definitions to model strategic uncertainty. Fix a topological space ⌦ and the Borel sigma-algebra thereof. Refer to Borel subsets of ⌦ as events. Write P(⌦) for the set of
The collection E is a set of conditioning events.
So, an array of conditional measures specifies a belief for each conditioning event. The array µ is countable if, for each E 2 E, there is a countable event F ✓ ⌦, with µ(F |E) = 1. Throughout the main text, we restrict attention to countable arrays. Appendix A shows that the restriction is without loss of generality.
An array of conditional measures specifies a belief for each conditioning event. A CPS is an array that satisfies the rules of conditional probability when possible. To better understand the conditioning requirement, fix conditioning events F and G so that F ✓ G. Informally, this can be viewed as a situation where G precedes F . The conditioning requirement says that, if µ(F |G) > 0, then µ(·|F ) must be derived from the 'prior belief'
First-Order Conditional Beliefs Bi's first-order beliefs are conditional beliefs about the strategy that B( i) chooses: Bi begins the game with an initial hypothesis about S i .
At each history at which Bi moves, she has a belief consistent with the history being reached.
Let S(h) be the set of strategy profiles (s 1 , s 2 ) so that the path induced by (s 1 , s 2 ) passes
Bi's conditioning events correspond to members of
Bi's first-order beliefs are described by a CPS µ i = (µ i (·|F i ) : F i 2 S i ) on (S i ; S i ). To understand how the conditioning requirement applies, consider histories h, h 0 2 H i so that h 7 Here, and throughout the paper, we write proj X Y for the projection of Y onto X.
) by the rules of conditional probability.
Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs
We will follow the literature and adapt Harsanyi's (1967) Definition 4.2. A type structure T specifies three objects for each Bi:
(i) a finite type set T i ;
(ii) a set of conditioning events S i ⌦ T i ; and
Definition 4.2 restricts attention to type structures with finite type sets. (This is relaxed
A type structure induces hierarchies of conditional beliefs about the strategies played.
To see this, observe that each type t i has a system of conditional beliefs on the strategies and types of B( i), viz. i (t i ). By marginalizing onto S i , each type t i then has a system of firstorder conditional beliefs on the strategies of B( i). Since each type t i is also associated with a system of first-order beliefs, i (t i ) induces a system of second-order beliefs-i.e., beliefs about the strategies and first-order beliefs of B( i). And so on.
Epistemic Game An epistemic game is given by a pair (B, T ), where B is the bargaining game and T is a type structure (associated with B). It induces states: A state (s 1 , t 1 , s 2 , t 2 ) describes each bargainer's play (i.e., s i ) and beliefs (i.e., i (t i )). An out-
On-Path Strategic Certainty As discussed in Section 2, on-path strategic certainty captures the idea that strategic uncertainty arises only after surprise moves in the negotiation process. To formalize the idea, fix an epistemic game and a state thereof, viz.
(s 1 , t 1 , s 2 , t 2 ). The state induces a path of play to a particular terminal node ⇣(s 1 , s 2 ) = z.
We want to capture the idea that, at each history h along this path of play, Bi assigns probability 1 to the terminal node ⇣(s 1 , s 2 ) = z being reached. Write
This consists of the strategies of B( i) that will induce the same terminal node as (s i , s i ), viz. ⇣(s 1 , s 2 ) = z, when Bi plays s i . If there is on-path strategic certainty at (s 1 , t 1 , s 2 , t 2 ), then, for each i = 1, 2 and each information set along the path of play to ⇣(s 1 , s 2 ) = z, t i
Definition 4.3 (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2002) .
If t i strongly believes an event E i , it assigns probability 1 to E i at the start of the game (since S i ( ) = S i ) and at each history (of Bi) consistent with E i . The information sets of Bi consistent with Z i [s 1 , s 2 ] are precisely the information sets along the path of play to 
Write C for the set of states at which there is on-path strategy certainty.
Strategic Sophistication: RCSBR
We next restrict the set of states by requiring that bargainers are "strategically sophisticated," in the sense of satisfying rationality and common strong belief of rationality.
So, if (s i , t i ) is rational, then at each history it allows, s i maximizes Bi's expected payo↵s under the marginal (or first-order) beliefs of t i . This maximization is done relative to all strategies that allow the history. Write R 1 i for the set of rational strategy-type pairs for i and R 1 = R 1 1 ⇥ R 1 2 for the set of states at which each bargainer is rational. Write
is the set of states at which there is rationality and (m 1) th -order strong belief of rationality. The set R 1 = R 1 1 ⇥ R 1 2 is the set of states at which there is rationality and common strong belief of rationality (RCSBR).
Remark 5.1. In Section 2, we argued that common strong belief of rationality captures forward-induction reasoning. To better understand the connection, consider two situations.
First, suppose type t 2 is consistent with RCSBR-i.e., t 2 2 proj T 2 R 1 2 . Then type t 2 begins the game assigning probability 1 to R 1 1 . Now suppose B1 makes an unexpected initial o↵er of (x 1 , x 2 )-i.e., an o↵er that t 2 initially assigned zero probability to. If that o↵er is consistent if RCSBR for B1-i.e., if there exists some (s 1 , t 1 ) 2 R 1 1 so that s 1 initially proposes (x 1 , x 2 )-then B2 must continue to assign probability 1 to R 1 1 . Second, suppose B1 makes an initial o↵er of (x 1 , x 2 ) with x 2 > . In that case, B1 cannot both be rational and strongly believe that B2 is rational: If she strongly believes that B2 is rational, then she believes that B2 would accept both (x 1 , x 2 ) and an o↵er (z 1 , z 2 ) with x 2 > z 2 > ; after all, in both cases, B2 gets more than the discounted value of the pie. If B1 were also rational, she would prefer o↵ering (z 1 , z 2 ) over (x 2 , x 2 ). So, conditional on such an o↵er, B2 cannot continue to believe that "B1 is rational and strongly believes rationality." But, B2 may well be able to believe that "B1 is rational." 9 This is what common strong belief of rationality requires: Specifically, if t 2 2 proj T 2 R 3 , then conditional on observing such an o↵er, she must assign probability 1 to R 1 1 . 2
Characterization Theorem
This section takes the perspective of an analyst that observes the bargaining game, but not the bargainers' type structure. Thus, it seeks to characterize the predictions of RCSBR and on-path strategic certainty across all associated type structures. Following Section 2, this will correspond to the outcomes that satisfy the Upfront and Deadline Constraints. We begin by reviewing the constraints. Then, we show that the set of outcomes consistent with RCSBR and on-path strategic certainty is the set of outcomes that satisfy these constraints.
The Constraints Recall, an outcome satisfies the Bi Upfront Constraint if Bi prefers the outcome to (1 ) upfront. When there is a deadline N < 1, an outcome satisfies the Deadline Constraint if the proposer in period N prefers the outcome to 1 in period N .
Observe, if N = 1, any outcome trivially satisfies the Deadline Constraint. 9 For instance, she would be able to believe this if there were a type t1 that initially believes "B2 rejects all o↵ers, irrespective of the history, and B2 responds with (y1, y2) = (1, 0) if and only if B1 o↵ers (x1, x2)."
Necessity of the Constraints Any state at which there is RCSBR and on-path strategic certainty induces an outcome that satisfies the UCs and DC. In fact, these constraints must be satisfied under weaker requirements.
Theorem 6.1. Fix an epistemic game (B, T ) and a state (s ⇤
, satisfies the UCs and DC.
Theorem 6.1 says that if, at a state, there is rationality, strong belief of rationality, and on-path strategic certainty, then the associated outcome satisfies the UCs and DC. Thus, in any type structure, weak requirements on strategic reasoning lead to an outcome that satisfies the constraints.
Su ciency of the Constraints The constraints are su cient for an outcome to be consistent with RCSBR and on-path strategic certainty. More specifically:
Theorem 6.2. Fix a bargaining game B and an outcome (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 , n) that satisfies the UCs and DC. There is an epistemic game (B, T ) and a state (s ⇤ 1 , t ⇤ 1 , s ⇤ 2 , t ⇤ 2 ) thereof, so that:
Theorem 6.2 says that if an outcome is consistent with the UCs and DC, the outcome is also consistent with RCSBR and on-path strategic certainty. So, outcomes consistent with these constraints are also consistent with the full force of strategic reasoning in some type structure. (See Section 8 for further discussion.) The example of a three-period deadline illustrates the proof of Theorem 6.2.
Example 6.1. Suppose N = 3 and 2 + 1. Note, the outcome (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 , n) = ( , 1 , 2) satisfies the UCs and DC. We will construct a type structure and a state (s ⇤
. Toward that end, let (s ⇤ 1 , s ⇤ 2 ) have the following features:
B1's Strategy, s ⇤ 1 : At the initial node, B1 o↵ers (x 1 , x 2 ) = (1, 0). If this o↵er is rejected and, subsequently, B2 o↵ers (y 1 , y 2 ), B1 accepts if and only if y 1
. At each thirdperiod history, B1 o↵ers (w 1 , w 2 ) = (1, 0).
B2's Strategy, s ⇤ 2 : B2 accepts an initial o↵er of (x 1 , x 2 ) if and only if x 2 > . If the initial o↵er is (x 1 , x 2 ) = (1, 0), B2 subsequently o↵ers (y 1 , y 2 ) = ( , 1 ). If the initial o↵er is (x 1 , x 2 ) with x 2 2 (0, ], B2 subsequently o↵ers (y 1 , y 2 ) = (0, 1). At each third-period history, B2 accepts an o↵er of (w 1 , w 2 ) if and only if w 2 > 0.
The belief maps i are described as follows: If s ⇤ i 2 S i (h), t ⇤ i assigns probability 1 to (s ⇤ i , t ⇤ i ) at h. At any other history h, t ⇤ i assigns probability 1 to a socalled "h-accommodating strategy" of B( i). This strategy allows h and, subsequently, accommodates Bi by o↵ering to take zero share of the pie and accepting any o↵er.
, there is on-path strategic certainty. In fact, there is common strong belief of on-path strategic certainty. (See Appendix B. ) Moreover, there is also RCSBR. We now provide the intuition. (The formal argument is more subtle.) First, (s ⇤ 1 , t ⇤ 1 ) is rational. At the start of the game, both t ⇤ 1 and t ⇤ 2 correctly anticipate the outcome (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 , 2) and believe that the other does. Moreover, there is an outcome (x 1 , x 2 , 1) that both bargainers strictly prefer to (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 , 2). But, o↵ering (x 1 , x 2 ) upfront would give t ⇤ 1 a strictly lower expected payo↵. Type t ⇤ 1 expects that if she were to make such o↵er, then B2 would reject it and propose to take the full pie.
Second, (s ⇤ 2 , t ⇤ 2 ) is rational. This may seem peculiar: B2 rejects an initial o↵er of (x 1 , x 2 ) with x 2 2 [0, ], even in the case where x 2 > x ⇤ 2 -i.e., even if he strictly prefers (x 1 , x 2 ) to the outcome that t ⇤ 2 expected to get at the start of negotiations. However, when such an o↵er is made, type t ⇤ 2 no longer expects the outcome to be (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 , 2). Instead, t ⇤ 2 expects the outcome to be (y 1 , y 2 , 2) = (0, 1, 2), which he prefers to (x 1 , x 2 , 1).
How, then, can t ⇤ 2 strongly believe R 1 1 ? After all, conditional on B1 proposing a mutually beneficial o↵er (x 1 , x 2 ), t ⇤ 2 believes that B1 will subsequently accept a zero share of the pie. The key is that, when B1 o↵ers some such (x 1 , x 2 ) upfront, B2 must maintain a hypothesis that B1 is irrational: At the initial node, every type of B1 believes that B2 rejects such a mutually beneficial o↵er and responds by o↵ering (y 1 , y 2 ) = (0, 1). Thus, conditional on B1 making such an o↵er, B2 must believe that B1 has not maximized her expected payo↵s. At that point, he may reason-as t ⇤ 2 does-that B1 will again fail to maximize her expected payo↵s in the future. For this reason, t ⇤ 2 strongly believes the event R 1 1 . Iterating this argument, at the state (s ⇤ 1 , t ⇤ 1 , s ⇤ 2 , t ⇤ 2 ), there is RCSBR. 2
We point to two features of Example 6.1. First, the construction satisfies a no indi↵erence property: Along the path of play, no bargainer is indi↵erent between any two actions. (See Remark B.4.) Second, under the construction, bargainers make tough o↵ers and counteroffers prior to agreement. While it is important that the o↵ers be 'tough' relative to the final allocation, there is no requirement on the trajectory of o↵ers. To see this, take N = 1 and = .8. The outcome (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 , n) = (.5, .5, 4) satisfies the UCs and DC. The proof assumes that, along the path of play, each bargainer o↵ers to take the full pie for herself. However, we can instead have a situation in which the bargainers' o↵ers are increasing over time. For instance, B1 may o↵er the allocation (.8, .2); B2 may respond with (.15, .85); and B1 may countero↵er with (.9, .1). But, likewise, we can also have a situation in which the bargainers' o↵ers are decreasing over time. For instance, B1 may o↵er the allocation (.8, .2); B2 may respond with (.3, .7); and B1 may countero↵er with (.65, .35).
Characterization Taken together, Theorems 6.1-6.2 characterize the set of outcomes consistent with RCSBR and on-path strategic certainty across all type structures. 
This raises the question: To what extent do the UCs and DC allow for delayed agreement? For any given ( , N ), there exists some n( , N ) 1 so that n( , N ) n if and only if there exists (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 , n) that satisfies the UCs and DC. Thus, n( , N ) is the maximum length of delay. In fact, N > n( , N ), and, when 1 > N 4, N 2 n( , N ). So, at the point of agreement, the bargainers must each be able to make at least one future o↵er. This stands in contrast to papers with private information (Fuchs and Skrzypacz, 2013) or with overconfidence in the ability to make future o↵ers (Yildiz, 2004; Simsek and Yildiz, 2014) . 10
It may well be that n( , N ) = 1, implying that there is no delay. (In particular, this will happen if is low.) However, for each N 3, there exists a su ciently large so that n( , N ) 2. 11 (See Proposition B.1.) Sections 10 B-C further discuss behavior.
Source of Delay: Second-Order Optimism
This section shows that second-order optimism is a necessary requirement for delayed agreements. The key step is definitional: to define what is meant by an o↵er causing B2 to "become more optimistic" about his future prospects. This means that B2's expected future payo↵s increase after receiving the o↵er.
Given a history h 2 H 2 and a strategy s 2 2 S 2 (h), write
for t 2 's expected payo↵s at h, when B2 plays the strategy s 2 2 S 2 (h). Then, a strategy-type pair (s 2 , t 2 ) is more optimistic at h 0 than at h if the type t 2 's expected continuation payo↵ from playing s 2 is higher at h 0 than at h:
Definition 7.1. Fix h, h 0 2 H 2 . Say that (s 2 , t 2 ) is more optimistic at h 0 than at h if
Definition 7.2. Fix a nonempty H 0 2 ✓ H 2 and a h 2 H 2 . Say that t 1 reasons that B2 is more optimistic at H 0 2 than at h if there exists an event E 2 ✓ S 2 ⇥ T 2 , so that 10 Such overconfident beliefs are often interpreted as "optimistic beliefs." Note that this notion of optimism is quite di↵erent from second-order optimism. 11 A su ciently large may be "far" from 1: If p 5 2 1 2 , then n( , N ) 2 irrespective of the deadline.
(i) 1, (t 1 )(E 2 ) = 1; and (ii) for each h 0 2 H 0 2 and each (s 2 , t 2 ) 2 E 2 , (s 2 , t 2 ) is more optimistic at h 0 than at h.
Definition 7.2 captures second-order optimism. Loosely, type t 1 reasons that B2 is more optimistic at H 0 2 than at h if, at the start of the game, she assigns probability 1 to strategytype pairs (s 2 , t 2 ), which are more optimistic at each h 0 2 H 0 2 than at h. Fix a state (s ⇤ 1 , t ⇤ 1 , s ⇤ 2 , t ⇤ 2 ) and suppose the state induces the outcome (
be the subset of one-period histories H R 2 that follow B1 making some o↵er that Pareto dominates (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 , n). Observe that [(x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 , n)] 6 = ; if and only if n 2. We will argue that, if n 2, then t ⇤ 1 reasons that B2 would be more optimistic at any history in [(x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 , n)] than he would be if B1 made the initial o↵er associated with s ⇤ 1 -i.e., if B1 initially proposes the allocation (s ⇤ 1 ( ), 1 s ⇤ 1 ( )).
Proposition 7.1. Fix a state (s ⇤ 1 , t ⇤ 1 , s ⇤ 2 , t ⇤ 2 ) at which:
(i) there is on-path strategic certainty,
Then, t ⇤ 1 reasons that B2 is more optimistic at [(x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 , n)] than at the history at which B1 makes an initial o↵er of (s ⇤ 1 ( ), 1 s ⇤ 1 ( )).
Fix a state (s ⇤ 1 , t ⇤ 1 , s ⇤ 2 , t ⇤ 2 ) at which there is on-path strategic certainty. Suppose, further, that at the initial node, B1 assigns probability 1 to "B2 is rational and B2 satisfies on-path strategic certainty." Proposition 7.1 says that, if that state induces an ine cient outcome, then B1 must reason that B2 would be more optimistic after any mutually beneficial o↵er than he would be after the initial o↵er associated with s ⇤ 1 .
Revisiting Type Structures
We took the description of the strategic situtation as an epistemic bargaining game (B, T ).
The type structure T represents the hierarchies of conditional beliefs that the bargainers consider possible. The bargainers then engage in forward-induction reasoning relative to those beliefs. Section 6 focused on the extreme case where the analyst does not have information about the bargainers' type structure. As a consequence, Theorems 6.1-6.2 characterized the outcomes consistent with RCSBR and on-path strategic certainty across all type structures: Theorem 6.1 shows that, in any type structure, rationality, strong belief of rationality and on-path strategic certainty imply that the outcome must satisfy the UCs and DC. Theorem 6.2 shows that any outcome that satisfies these constraints is consistent with RCSBR and on-path strategic certainty in some type structure. 
So, a degenerately complete type structure has all point beliefs, but may also have non-point beliefs. A complete type structure (Brandenburger, 2003 )-i.e., a type structure where 1 and 2 are onto-is a specific example of a degenerately complete type structure.
Proposition 8.1. Let N = 3 and T be degenerately complete. If (s 1 , t 1 , s 2 , t 2 ) 2 T m R m \C, (s 1 , s 2 ) results in immediate agreement on the subgame perfect allocation.
The proof can be found in Online Appendix E. To understand the result, begin with an arbitrary finite game. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) show that, if T is complete, then RCSBR is behaviorally equivalent to the solution concept of extensive-form rationalizability (Pearce, 1984, EFR) . Here we have an analogous relationship: When T is degenerately complete, the behavioral implications of RCSBR corresponds to EFR. 12 In turn, EFR implies that B1 initially proposes the subgame perfect allocation. On-path strategic certainty further implies that the o↵er is accepted immediately.
There is a question of whether Proposition 8.1 holds when N > 3. The answer is unknown because EFR behavior is not known beyond N = 3. At first, this may be surprising: It would appear that two known results in the literature would allow us to infer EFR behavior. As we now point out, this is not easily achieved.
Remark 8.1. In a finite game satisfying a no-ties condition, EFR is outcome equivalent to subgame perfection. (See Battigalli, 1997 and Chen and Micali, 2012 .) So, one might be tempted to conclude that EFR behavior is known in discretized versions of the bargaining game. But, the bargaining game has ties; discretized versions will have ties when the grid is fine. Thus, one cannot easily apply these results. 2
Remark 8.2. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) provide a dominance procedure for extensiveform games and apply it to the bargaining game without a deadline. In conjunction with an equilibrium assumption, the dominance procedure leads to the subgame perfect outcome. The Fudenberg-Tirole procedure is defined on actions; as an output, it delivers a set of strategies that is a product of the action sets. EFR is defined on strategies and-at least on low rounds-is not a product of actions. This fact leads to computational di culties absent from Fudenberg and Tirole's (1991) On-path strategic certainty is, arguably, best understood from the analyst's perspective:
An outside observer can verify whether the bargainers have correct beliefs along the path of play. However, Bi cannot herself verify this fact, since she does not know the actual strategy employed by B( i). Moreover, on the surface, on-path strategic certainty does not appear to be an implication of introspective strategic reasoning. This stands in contrast to strong belief of rationality, which is as an assumption about introspective strategic reasoning.
Can we replace the assumption of on-path strategic certainty with the assumption of RCSBR? The answer is yes, provided we rule out a degenerate form of strategic uncertainty. Return to the three-period deadline example. Suppose B1 initially proposes the SPE allocation (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 ) = (1 (1 ), (1 )), believing that her o↵er will be accepted.
But she is incorrect. B2 rejects the o↵er and subsequently proposes (y ⇤ 1 , y ⇤ 2 ) = ( , 1 ), believing that his o↵er will be accepted. He, too, is incorrect. B1 rejects the o↵er and proposes (w ⇤ 1 , w ⇤ 2 ) = (1, 0). Although this situation is consistent with RCSBR, it violates the constraints and results in perpetual disagreement. (See Section F.4.) But, arguably, it is a degenerate form of delay: When B2 o↵ers (y ⇤ 1 , y ⇤ 2 ), he anticipates that any o↵er of (y 1 , y 2 ) with y 1 < (resp. y 1 > ) will be rejected (resp. accepted). B2 o↵ers (y ⇤ 1 , y ⇤ 2 ) only because he has incorrect beliefs about how B1 acts when indi↵erent (between accept/reject). 13
This section shows that the message holds whenever the game has a deadline: Fix a state at which there is RCSBR, and no bargainer faces uncertainty about how the other breaks indi↵erences. Then, the UCs and DC must be satisfied. In fact, we will see that the converse also holds. To formalize the idea, we will need several definitions. 13 Note, in the epistemic model, we can-and typically do-have strategic uncertainty even when agents face no uncertainty about how other agents act when indi↵erent. This stands in contrast to an equilibrium analysis of a complete information model, where strategic uncertainty must be an artifact of uncertainty about how others behave when indi↵erent. The assertion is that behavior that is an artifact of uncertainty about how others break indi↵erences is of lesser interest.
Definition 9.1. Call two outcomes, (
Note, two distinct outcomes that are Bi-equivalent will not be B( i)-equivalent. We are interested in whether there are distinct Bi-equivalent outcomes consistent with both RCSBR and a history h.
Definition 9.2. Fix some s i 2 S i and some µ i 2 P(S i ⇥ T i ). Say that (s i , µ i ) has a distinguished outcome if there exists some event
) has a distinguished outcome. Then, we can find an outcome (x 1 , x 2 , n)
and an event E i so that
duces the outcome (x 1 , x 2 , n). To better understand the definition, suppose that (s i , i,h (t i ))
does not have a distinguished outcome. Then, at h, t i faces an extreme form of uncertainty about the outcome that will obtain: For each (x 1 , x 2 , n) consistent with h, i,h (t i ) assigns zero probability to the situation that "(x 1 , x 2 , n) obtains when Bi plays s i ." (Formally, if
Definition 9.3. Fix an epistemic game (B, T ) and a state (s 1 , t 1 , s 2 , t 2 ) at which there is
there is a history h 2 H i with (s 1 , s 2 ) 2 S 1 (h) ⇥ S 2 (h), so that the following hold:
(i) There are distinct B( i)-equivalent outcomes in ⇠(⇣(proj S R 1 \ S(h))).
(ii) If (s i , i,h (t i )) has a distinguished outcome, then there exists some event E i with i,h (E i ) > 0 so that, for each (r i , t i ) 2 E i , the following is satisfied: (a) r i 2 S i (h), (b) ⇠(⇣(s i , r i )) 6 = ⇠(⇣(s i , s i )), and (c) ⇡ i (s i , r i ) = ⇡ i (s i , s i ).
Suppose, at (s 1 , t 1 , s 2 , t 2 ), B1 is uncertain about how B2 breaks indi↵erences. Then, (s 1 , s 2 ) allows a history h at which t 1 faces uncertainty about distinct outcomes that are payo↵equivalent for B2. The nature of this uncertainty can take one of two forms. At h, t 1 may assign positive probability to an event in which "the wrong B2-equivalent outcome" obtains. Alternatively, at h, t 1 may not have a distinguished outcome; in that case, she cannot assign probability 1 to the event that the correct outcome will obtain. The converse is also true. Fix an outcome (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 , n) that satisfies the UCs and DC. We can construct a type structure and a state (s ⇤ 10 Discussion 10.A Nash Equilibrium Theorem 6.1 and the proof of Theorem 6.2 give the following:
If (s 1 , t 1 , s 2 , t 1 ) 2 R 1 \ C, then there exists some Nash equilibrium in sequentially optimal strategies, viz. (r 1 , r 2 ), so that (s 1 , s 2 ) and (r 1 , r 2 ) are outcome-equivalent. Thus, RCSBR and on-path strategic certainty give Nash outcomes in sequentially optimal strategies.
It is useful to connect to the literature. Fix a finite game of perfect information. If the game satisfies a no-ties condition called transference of decision-maker indi↵erence (Marx and Swinkels, 1997, TDI) , then the RCSBR strategies are sequentially optimal and give a Nash outcome. (See Battigalli and Friedenberg, 2012a, Lemma 8. Note, this statement is weaker than the statement in the previous paragraph.) More specifically, in a game satisfying TDI, RCSBR alone implies a constant payo↵ condition; in turn, TDI plus that condition imply on-path strategic certainty. However, the bargaining game violates TDI, and this generates a more subtle relationship: While RCSBR alone does not imply the constant payo↵ condition, RCSBR plus no uncertainty about breaking indi↵erences (Definition 9.3) does. This delivers a Nash outcome, but does not imply on-path strategic certainty.
Thus, there is a gap between the results in Sections 6 and 9.
10.B Subgame Perfect Equilibrium For any given ( , N ), the subgame perfect out-
, 1) satisfies the UCs and DC. Thus, the subgame perfect no-delay outcome is consistent with R 1 \ C. In the specific case of no deadline, (x SPE 1 , x SPE 2 , n) satisfies the UCs and DC if and only if n  n( , 1). As such, for any given , the longest length of delay involves the parties agreeing either on the SPE allocation or a nearby allocation. 14 When is large, the delay is arbitrarily long, only to agree on a close to 50:50 split of the pie.
10.C No Deadline: Anything Goes Result
Consider the case of no deadline. For any given , n( , 1) < 1. Thus, for a given discount factor, there is a bound on delay.
However, for any given n, This provides an anything goes result in an important limiting case: When the discount factor is close to 1, there can be arbitrarily long delays and the bargainers can agree on essentially any allocation. This constrasts with Myerson's (1997) one-sided reputational bargaining model. (See Compte and Jehiel, 2002, Proposition 2.) We can reinterpret this limiting case in terms of frequent o↵ers: Consider a continuous time variant of the model, where the bargainers are restricted to make o↵ers at intervals of length > 0. The original model can be embedded into this one, by taking = e r for a common discount rate r. Thus, a fixed discount factor can be viewed as the case in which the time between o↵ers( is significant. When the time between o↵ers gets small, the length of delay gets large. See Online Appendix H.
10.D Extension: Outside Options
In the context of the reputational bargaining, Compte and Jehiel (2002) show that outside options typically serve to cancel out the possibility of obstinacy in bargaining-the parties seeks to reveal themselves as 'rational' as soon as possible. (The term 'typical' reflects a minor condition on parameters. The result is true both for one-and two-sided uncertainty about strategic posture.) We now show that, under the analysis here, there may be long delays, even in the presence of outside options.
The model follows Compte and Jehiel (2002) : There is no deadline. In any bargaining phase, the responder can either accept the proposal, reject the proposal and continue negotiations, or reject the proposal and exercise the outside option. In the last case, the bargaining terminates and the bargainers obtain an outside option (w 1 , w 2 ) with w 1 + w 2  1.
At any state at which there is RCSBR, on-path strategic certainty, and delay, no Bi exercises her outside option: If this were not the case, B2 would anticipate that his payo↵ is some n 1 w 2 < w 2 ; he would instead exercise the outside option immediately. With this in mind, states at which there is RCSBR, on-path strategic certainty, and delay involve agreement on some allocation-i.e., an outcome (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 , n) with n 2. Outcomes consistent with RCSBR, on-path strategic certainty and delay can be characterized by Outside Option Constraints (OOCs) and Generalized Upfront Constraints (GUCs). (See Online Appendix H.) An outcome (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 , n) satisfies the OOCs if each Bi prefers the outcome to getting the outside option in the first feasible period (i.e., period 2 for B1 and period 1 for B2). With this, the OOCs require n 1
x ⇤ 1 w 1 and n 1 x ⇤ 2 w 2 . An outcome (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 , n) satisfies the GUCs if each Bi prefers the outcome to what she can secure upfront. However, now, Bi need not think that B( i) will accept o↵ers in ( , w i ); thus, Bi can secure 1 max{ , w i } upfront. With this, the GUCs require n 1
x ⇤ 1 1 max{ , w 2 } and n 1 x ⇤
2
(1 max{ , w 1 }).
If a delayed outcome (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 , n) with n 3 satisfies the OOCs and GUCs, then it satisfies the UCs. But the converse need not hold. Thus, the presence of outside options can limit the scope of delay. 15 Moreover, for each n 2, lim !1 {x 1 : (x 1 , x 2 , n) satisfies the OOCs and GUCs} = [w 1 , 1 w 2 ] 6 = ;.
In this limiting case, there can be arbitrarily long delays. But, the resulting set of allocations is bounded-substantially bounded if the outside options are close to e cient.
10.E Incomplete vs. Complete Type Structures To understand the relationship between Theorem 6.2 and Proposition 8.1, it will be useful to review the nature of forwardinduction reasoning as implemented here.
Refer to Remark 5.1. RCSBR captures the idea that the bargainers adopt a hypothesis consistent with the highest form of strategic sophistication possible. In this sense, it formalizes forward-induction reasoning. But, importantly, the "highest form of strategic sophistication possible" depends on both the parameters of the bargaining game and the bargainers' type structure. This implies that forward-induction reasoning can be both pure and contextualized. We now explain.
Fix a type structure. The structure can be associated with an event about the players' beliefs: Each type in that structure fully believes the event-that is, each type does not give up on the hypothesis that the event is true irrespective of the evidence. 16 Moreover, the event is common full belief amongst the types in that structure. When RCSBR is applied to the type structure, players engage in forward-induction reasoning relative to the common full belief event. (See Appendix A in Battigalli and Friedenberg, 2012b for a finite game result.) So, in the case of a surprise move, a player never gives up on the hypothesis that the event is true, nor on the hypothesis that "the other player never gives up on the hypothesis that the event is true," etc. This may well imply that, after a surprise move, the player may not be able to rationalize past behavior. That is, the common full belief event limits the players' ability to rationalize past behavior. Incomplete type structures are typically associated with a non-trivial common belief event-i.e., an event that is a strict subset of the set of all hierarchies of beliefs. By constrast, complete type structures are typically associated with a trivial event-i.e., an event that corresponds to the set of all hierarchies of beliefs. 17 As such, in incomplete type structures, the common full belief event typically limits the players' ability to rationalize past behavior. By contrast, in complete type structures, the ability to rationalize past behavior is typically not limited by the common full belief event.
15 If (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 , 2) satisfies the OOCs and the GUCs, then either it satisfies the UCs or (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 ) = (w1, 1 w1). 16 Importantly, because the event is only about beliefs, that event will never be contradicted by evidence. So, players can hold onto the hypothesis irrespective of observed play. (If the event involved strategies, it may be contradicted by some observed play; if so, it is impossible to fully believe the event. For instance, in the bargaining game, it is impossible to fully believe the event R 1 i (i.e., irrespective of the type structure). 17 Results in Friedenberg (2010) and Friedenberg and Keisler (2011) explain why we say "typically."
The distinction between RCSBR applied to incomplete versus complete type structures is what Battigalli, Friedenberg, and Siniscalchi (2012) refer to as contextualized-forwardinduction reasoning versus pure-forward-induction reasoning. (See, also, Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler, 2008, pg. 319.) The idea is that the the social situation may exist in the context of history, cultural norms, etc. . .; that context can impact the players'
beliefs. An incomplete structure corresponds to a situation in which the context gives rise to a non-trivial common full belief event. In that case, RCSBR gives rise to a contextualizedforward-induction reasoning. By contrast, a complete structure corresponds to a contextfree situation. In this sense, RCSBR gives rise to a more pure-forward-induction reasoning.
With this in mind, suppose that N = 3 and return to Proposition 8.1 and Theorem 6.2.
Proposition 8.1 says that, if the bargainers' type structure is complete, then RCSBR and on-path strategic certainty imply immediate agreement. By contrast, Theorem 6.2 gives that RCSBR and on-path strategic certainty are consistent with delayed agreement. Thus, when N = 3, part of the explanation for delay involves incomplete type structures: The bargainers can satisfy on-path strategic certainty, engage in contextualized-forward-induction reasoning, and exhibit delayed agreements. But, if they satisfy on-path strategic certainty and engage in pure-forward-induction reasoning, they cannot have delayed agreements.
This raises the question: Which common full belief events give rise to delayed agreements. A better understanding of these events is important for understanding the ingredients of delayed agreement. This is left as an open question.
Appendix A Preliminaries
This Appendix generalizes the framework in Sections 4-5. The purpose is to be sure that our analysis does not hinge on simplifying assumptions. Throughout, we identify a history with a sequence of nodes. For instance, the history that coincides with an initial o↵er of (x 1 , x 2 ) is written as ( , x 1 ). As such, if h 0 precedes h, then h 0 is an initial segment of h.
Topology Endow [0, 1] with the Euclidean metric and {a, r} with the discrete metric.
Endow S i with the product topology-i.e, the weak topology generated by the projection maps (proj h : S i ! C h : h 2 H i ). Then, S i is a compact Hausdor↵ space.
Let Z D be the set of disagreement terminal histories. Note, any history in (H [ Z)\Z D is a finite history and any history in Z D is a countable history.
Lemma A.1.
(iii) For each z 2 Z and each s i 2 S i , the set {s i : ⇣(s i , s i ) = z} is Borel.
Proof. Part (i) (resp. (ii)) is immediate from the fact that a finite (resp. countable) intersection of sets (proj h ) 1 ({c h }) is closed (resp. Borel). For part (iii), fix z 2 Z and s i 2 S i . If s i 6 2 S i (z), then {s i : ⇣(s i , s i ) = z} = ; is Borel. So suppose s i 2 S i (z). By parts (i)-(ii), it su ces to show {s i : ⇣(s i , s i ) = z} = S i (z): By definition, {s i :
It follows that, along the path from the root to the terminal node z, r i and s i must specify the same choices. So ⇣(s i , s i ) = ⇣(r i , s i ).
Type Structures
We adapt the approach in Ben-Porath (1997) and Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999) Definition A.1. A type structure T specifies three objects for each Bi:
(i) T i is a compact Hausdor↵ type set;
We will abuse notation and write i,h (t i ) for i (t i )(·|S i (h)⇥T i ) (resp. i, (t i ) for i (t i )(·|S i ⇥ T i )). We will say that the type structure has countable beliefs if each i (t i ) is a countable CPS. Definition 4.2 is an example of a type structure with countable beliefs.
Remark A.1. A conceptual issue underlies the definitions: If a countable array satisfies the conditioning requirement, then it satisfies the rules of conditional probability when possible.
The same is true when the conditioning events are countable-i.e., even if the array is not countable. For more general arrays or conditioning events, the conditioning requirement should be viewed as a minimal criteriaon to capture the desired idea.
We don't know if, in this more general case, Definition 4.1 is overly permissive. That said, this potential additional generality is immaterial. Ultimately, our behavioral result will be a Sandwich Theorem: Theorem 6.1 involves a permissive definition of beliefs, and Theorem 6.2 involves countable beliefs. We conjecture that such a Sandwich approach may be a useful technique in other epistemic analyses of infinite games. 2
Many definitions in the main text apply to Definition A.1. But, two amendments are needed.
integrable. Then, write
Definition of Rationality Begin with a definition.
Definition A.2. Fix a strategy s i and an array µ i on (S i ; S i ). Say s i is sequentially optimal under µ i if, for each information set h 2 H i with s i 2 S i (h), the following hold: (1 )
n 1 otherwise.
In the proof of Theorem 6.1, we take a general definition of a type structure (Definition A.1). We show that, if a state is in R 2 \ C, then it induces an outcome (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 , n), where x ⇤ 1 2 [x n , x n ]. In the proof of Theorem 6.2, we fix some outcome (
We then show that we can construct a finite type structure with countable beliefs (Definition 4.2) and a state that induces the outcome (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 , n), so that the state is in R 1 \ C. Taken together, the two results provide a "sandwich" on behavior.
B.1 Proof of Theorem 6.1
Here, we take a general definition of a type structure (Definition A.1).
The first remark is immediate.
An immediate implication is:
where Bi is the proposer in period n.
(ii) If n = N , then there exists an N -period history
Proof. First, let n  N 1. By assumption, there is an n-period history h ⇤ 2 H P i with Fix some x i 2 [0, 1 ). Since n  N 1, we can construct a strategy r i so that
The next step is to establish the UCs. In fact, we will establish this under a somewhat weaker assumption. (We will later make use of this stronger result.)
then n 1 x ⇤ Now, use the fact that t ⇤ i strongly believes R 1 i and
). It follows from Lemma B.5 that, for each x i 2 [0, 1),
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Immediate from Lemmata B.4-B.6.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 6.2
The set of states at which there is on-path strategic certainty and common strong belief of on-path strategic certainty is
Throughout the exposition, we fix some finite time period n with n  N and some x ⇤ 2 [x n , x n ]. We begin by constructing particular strategies s ⇤ 1 and s ⇤ 2 , so that (s ⇤ 1 , s ⇤ 2 ) induces the outcome (x ⇤ 1 , x ⇤ 2 , n) = (x ⇤ , 1 x ⇤ , n). To do so, it will be convenient to fix a particular history h ⇤ 2 H P 1 [ H P 2 . If n = 1, h ⇤ = . If n 2, h ⇤ = (1, r, . . . , 1, r)-i.e., there are (n 1) o↵ers of 1 followed by (n 1) rejections.
The strategy s ⇤ i satisfies the following properties. For any history h 2 H P i , set
For each h 2 H P i , set s ⇤ i (h, x i ) = a if and only if one of the following holds: (i) x i 2 [0, 1 ), (ii) h = h ⇤ and x i = x ⇤ i , or (iii) h is an N -period history and x i 2 [0, 1). Note that the strategy profile (s ⇤ 1 , s ⇤ 2 ) induces each bargainer to propose 1, reject, propose 1, reject, etc., up until the n th -bargaining phase. In the n th -bargaining phase, the proposer makes an o↵er that is accepted. This o↵er is x ⇤ 1 = x ⇤ if B1 is the proposer and x ⇤ 2 = 1 x ⇤ if B2 is the proposer. As such, in the n th -bargaining phase, the bargainers agree on (x ⇤ , 1 x ⇤ ). The construction of the type structure will be analogous to Example 6.1. Bi begins the game with a hypothesis that B( i) plays the strategy s ⇤ i . If Bi observes a deviation from this behavior, she updates her belief and subsequently expects that B( i) will act in an accommodating manner. Thus, it will be useful to have the concept of the accommodating strategy. The accommodating strategy for bargainer i, written ↵ i , is a strategy such that ↵ i (h) = 0 for all h 2 H P i and ↵ i (h, x i ) = a for all (h, x i ) 2 H R i . The h-accommodating strategy for bargainer i, written ↵ h i is a strategy that allows h but otherwise agrees with the accommodating strategy. Now, construct T = (B; T 1 , T 2 ; S 1 , S 2 ; 1 , 2 ) so that, for each Bi, T i = {t ⇤ i } and • i,h (t ⇤ i )(s ⇤ i , t ⇤ i ) = 1, if s ⇤ i 2 S i (h), and
Notice that i (t ⇤ i ) is a conditional probability system. This is immediate from the following fact: If S i (h 0 )⇥T i ✓ S i (h)⇥T i and ↵ h i 2 S i (h 0 ), then the h 0 -accommodating strategy ↵ h 0 i is the h-accommodating strategy ↵ h i . With this, T satisfies Definition 4.2.
Theorem 6.2 follows immediately from the following Lemma:
The key to showing Lemma B.7 is establishing the following lemmata:
Lemma B.9. Each R 1 i is closed.
Proof of Lemma B.7. By Lemma B.8, for each i = 1, 2
We will show that, for each m 2,
Observe 
Repeating the argument for each m establishes the result inductively.
Remark B.3. In light of Lemma B.7, we could alternatively show that (s ⇤ 1 , t ⇤ 1 , s ⇤ 2 , t ⇤ 2 ) satisfies the equilibrium dominance criterion in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002, Section 6.1 and, if Bi is the proposer in period N , ⇡ i (s ⇤ i , s ⇤ i ) N 1 . We use these facts below. Suppose ⇣(r i , s ⇤ i ) 6 = ⇣(s ⇤ i , s ⇤ i ). Then, there is some k-period history h 2 H i so that s ⇤ i , r i 2 S i (h), s ⇤ i 2 S i (h), but s ⇤ i (h) 6 = r i (h). (Note, k  n.) We will show that ⇡ i (s ⇤ i , s ⇤ i ) > ⇡ i (r i , s ⇤ i ), from which the result follows. First, let h 2 H P i with r i (h) 2 [0, 1 ). Then, s ⇤ i (h, r i (h)) = a and, so, ⇡ i (r i , s ⇤ i ) = k 1 r i (h) < k 1 (1 ). Note, ⇡ i (s ⇤ i , s ⇤ i ) k 1 (1 ), since k 2 when Bi=B2. Thus, (1 ) i fB i is the responder in N.
(One possibility is that (r i , s ⇤ i ) results in agreement on some o↵er made by Bi in period < N; this can happen only if x i 2 [0, 1 ). A second possibility is that (r i , s ⇤ i ) results in agreement on some o↵er made by Bi in period N ; this can happen only if x i 2 [0, 1). The final possibility is that (r i , s ⇤ i ) results in x i = 0.) Thus, ⇡ i (s ⇤ i , s ⇤ i ) > ⇡ i (r i , s ⇤ i ). Finally, let h = (·, x) 2 H R i with h 6 = (h ⇤ , x ⇤ i ). Then, h = (·, 1), s ⇤ i (h) = r 6 = a = r i (h). It follows that ⇡ i (s ⇤ i , s ⇤ i ) > 0 = ⇡ i (r i , s ⇤ i ). Lemma B.11. Fix an n-period history h 2 H i with s ⇤ i 2 S i (h) but s ⇤ i 6 2 S i (h). For each r i 2 S i (h),
and only if either
• ⇣(r i , ↵ h i ) = ⇣(s ⇤ i , ↵ h i ), • n < N, h = (·, 1 ) 2 H R i , and r i (h) = a, or • n = N , h = (·, 1) 2 H R i , and r i (h) = a.
Proof. Fix an n-period history h 2 H i with s
Then, there exists h 0 2 H i that (weakly) follows h, so that (s ⇤ i , ↵ h i ), (r i , ↵ h i ) 2 S(h 0 ), but s ⇤ i (h 0 ) 6 = r i (h 0 ). There are four cases. First, suppose that h 2 H P i . Then, for each x i , ↵ h i (h, x i ) = a. As such, h 0 = h and r i (h) < 1. So, ⇡ i (s ⇤ i , ↵ h i ) = n 1 > n 1 r i (h) = ⇡ i (r i , ↵ h i ). Second, suppose that n < N, h = (·, x i ) 2 H R i and x i 2 [0, 1 ). Then, s ⇤ i (h) = a and, so, h 0 = h. Thus, r i (h) = r and, so, ⇡ i (s ⇤ i , ↵ h i ) = n 1 (1 x i ) > n = ⇡ i (r i , ↵ h i ). Third, suppose that n < N, h = (·, x i ) 2 H R i and x i 2 [1 , 1]. Then, s ⇤ i (h) = r. If h 0 6 = h, then h 0 = (h, r) 2 H P i . (This follows from the fact that ↵ h i (h, r, ·) = a.) Thus, the that Pareto dominates ⇠(⇣(s ⇤ 1 , r 2 )) = ⇠(⇣(s ⇤ 1 , s ⇤ 2 )), (r 2 , u 2 ) is more optimistic at ( , y 1 ) than at ( , s ⇤ 1 ( )).
